Agency--Workmen\u27s Compensation Act by Pendleton, Roscoe H.
Volume 35 Issue 3 Article 12 
April 1929 
Agency--Workmen's Compensation Act 
Roscoe H. Pendleton 
West Virginia University College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr 
 Part of the Agency Commons, and the Workers' Compensation Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Roscoe H. Pendleton, Agency--Workmen's Compensation Act, 35 W. Va. L. Rev. (1929). 
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol35/iss3/12 
This Student Notes and Recent Cases is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The 
Research Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized 
editor of The Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu. 
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
herently dangerous potentialities of explosives, but the case is not
an adoption of the turntable or attractive nuisance doctrine.
While the case cites with approval certain quotations taken
from decisions whose distinct tendency is to accept the turntable
doctrine in appropriate cases, it has also utilized quotations from
opinions of courts whose trend of decisions apparently repudiate
the doctrine. See 36 A. L. R. 69, 106 for alignment of courts on
this question. Consequently it is submitted that the principal
case is entirely in accord with the previous West Virginia cases
which repudiate this doctrine, and is an express approval and
affirmation of the doctrine laid down in Wellman v. Fordson Coal
Company, supra. This doctrine is not an innovation upon the
law of this state, but rather it will, in consonancy with previous
decisions, allow recovery in appropriate cases, without the adop-
tion of a doctrine which our court has deemed undesirable.
-- LLsJSm C. HESS.
AGENCY-WORKMEN's COMPENSATION AcT.-The defendant, a
manufacturer of lumber, who was subject to the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act and who had failed to comply therewith used
an unguarded circular saw in his business. The plaintiff, an em-
ployee of the defendant, was injured while using this saw and
seeks to recover damages, basing his claim on a violation of sec-
tion 59 of chapter 15H of BARNES' CODE which is in part as
follows:
"All power driven machinery, including all saws,
shall be so located, whenever possible, as not to be dangerous
to employees, or where possible, be properly inclosed, fenced
or otherwise protected."
The defense was contributory negligence on the part of the plain-
tiff. The court held that the defendant was liable, under this
statute, and the court said, among other things, that the duty of
a principal to guard a power driven saw (if possible to do so)
is absolute, and that disregard of a statutory duty is prima facie
negligence when it is the natural and proximate cause of the in-
jury. Tarr v. Keller Lumber & Construction Company, 144 S. E.
881 (W. Va. 1928).
The decision of the case presents tvo questions; first, whether
the plaintiff's injury resulted from a breach of duty owed him by
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the defendant, and second, whether the defendant has a defense.
It is plain that the first question must be answered in the af-
firmative. McClary v. Knight, 73 W. Va. 385, 80 S. E. 866. The
statute imposed a duty upon the defendant to guard the saw, he
violated this duty and as a result the plaintiff was injured. Sec-
ond, the question whether contributory negligence is a defense.
The defendant is subject to the Workmen's Compensation Act,
BARNEs' CODE, Chapter 15P, section 15; and has failed to comply
therewith. The Act, -CODE, supra, chapter 15P, section 26, pro-
vides, in effect, that as to any employer subject to the Act who
fails to comply therewith, such employer cannot set up contribu-
tory negligence as a defense. Therefore the statute bars this de-
fense, and the decision of the court is clearly justifiable. The
court in referring to the Compensation Act, said: "As the de-
fendant was not a subscriber to the workmen's compensation fund,
it cannot avail itself of the plaintiff's contributory negligence."
-ROSCOE H. PENDLETON.
EviDCE - HOMICIDE - SELF-DEFENSE-VIOLENT AcTs or DE-
CEASED.-In an indictment for murder the accused relied on self-
defense, and was permitted to testify that deceased was a danger-
ous man, and had on one occasion shot at an officer who was at-
tempting to arrest him. It was not shown that the accused saw
this occurrence. The officer was not permitted to testify as to
the incident. Held, that there was no error prejudicial to the
accused. State v. Peoples, 145 S. E. 389 (W. Va. 1928).
In general, proof of the character or reputation of the de-
ceased is inadmissible in homicide cases. Evers v. State, 31 Tex.
Crim. 318, 20 S. W. 744; State v. Madison, 49 W. Va. 96, 38 S.
E. 492.
On the issue of self-defense, however, communicated reputation
for violence is admissible to show that the accused had reasonable
apprehension of bodily harm. Commonwealth v. Tircinski, 189
Mass. 257, 75 N. E. 261. There is some conflict as to uncom-
municated reputation of this character, but the better and ma-
jority rule is that such evidence is admissible to show the proba-
bility that the deceased did an act of aggression. State v. Mc-
Olausland, 82 W. Va. 525, 96 S. E. 938; Pamore v. State, 29 Ark.
248; Thomas v. People, 67 N. Y. 224; 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, (2nd
ed.) §63.
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